Easy Issue for Me, Hard Issue for Them: Field Experiment in Large Social Survey by Shimizu Kazumi et al.
Easy Issue for Me, Hard Issue for Them: 
Field Experiment in Large Social Survey1 
 
Kazumi Shimizu2 
Kentaro Fukumoto3 
Motoki Watabe4 
Yuko Morimoto5 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Political scientists and economists often model the collective action problem as prisoner’s dilemma 
in which noncooperation is the dominant strategy and no public goods are provided in the 
equilibrium. But, in reality, public goods are provided. We hypothesize that public goods are 
provided when people receive message in a way that they easily come to understand the merits of 
their provision, and when they expect others to understand the merits as well. To test this hypothesis, 
we have imbedded an experiment within our nation-wide surveys conducted in Japan in 2007 using 
CASI (computer assisted self-administered interview) technology.  In the virtual space on a mobile 
computer, we have created an experimental situation where a respondent has to decide whether to 
cooperate for public goods provision by paying some personal cost. The game is designed as “public 
goods provision game with thresholds” where both “cooperation (at thresholds) and 
“noncooperation” are Nash equilibria, although the former is Pareto optimal. We argue that, if public 
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goods provision is presented to players as easy issue, they will choose the cooperation equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if public goods provision is regarded by players as hard issue, they will select the 
noncooperation equilibrium. The key for testing the above hypothesis is to manipulate the 
respondent’s comprehension level and her/his expectation for others’ behavior in an experimental 
setting. From our experiments, we have obtained some interesting findings regarding 
“comprehension” and “expectation” on public action.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The collective action problem can be modeled as threshold public goods game. In such a game, we 
argue that presenting public goods as easy issue is helpful. The reason is that people tend to expect 
that the others will also pay the cost for public goods provision and makes a cooperation equilibrium 
the focal point. To validate our hypothesis, this paper employs field experiment in large social survey 
via CASI (computer assisted self interview).  
Political scientists often model the collective action problem as prisoner’s dilemma where 
noncooperation is the dominant strategy and no public goods are provided in the equilibrium (Olson, 
1965, Ostrom, 1990). But, in reality, public goods are provided. Instead, we employ a threshold 
public goods game. In this game, when the number of cooperators is larger than the threshold level, 
public goods are provided. In some equilibria, some players cooperate and public goods are provided. 
Moreover, the game can be applied to various familiar situations of the collective action problem. 
The present paper uses the two examples, namely, garbage problem and bid-rigging problem, for 
illustration. 
Let us explain bid-rigging problem first. Suppose that a city proposes an ordinance to 
prohibit bid-rigging. If half of voters approve it, an ordinance will be effective.  No residents would 
object to this ordinance But it is unlikely that all residents would vote because going to the ballot 
box is troublesome. Thus, turnout might be lower than half and voting might fail to be effective. 
Roughly speaking, if residents expect turnout to be around 50%, they think their ballot might be 
decisive and feel like going to vote. As a result, the ordinance will be approved. On the other hand, if 
residents expect turnout to be far much lower than 50%, they find it meaningless to vote. Thus, the 
ordinance will not be established. In this case, the ordinance is public goods, voting is cooperation, 
abstention is noncooperation and the threshold level is 50%. 
This kind of problem is not limited to politics. Another example is a garbage problem. 
Suppose that a new garbage bag was invented, which prevents animals from biting and scratching it. 
If more than half residents use it, a town will be free from garbage foraging animals on the road. 
That sounds good news. But since this new garbage bag is more expensive than usual one, not all 
people would buy it. Citizens might buy the bag if they think others also do the same. The new bag 
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will prevail in the neighborhood. On the other hand, citizens won’t buy the bag if they think others 
don’t. Thus, the community fails to expel foraging animals due to insufficient usage of the new 
garbage bag. In this case, the new garbage bag is public goods, buying it is cooperation, not buying it 
is noncooperation and the threshold level is 50%. 
Our question is what decides which consequence results. We argue that, if public goods 
dilemma is presented as easy issue, players will choose the cooperation equilibrium. On the other 
hand, if public goods dilemma is regarded as hard issue, players will select the noncooperation 
equilibrium. 
To test our argument, we perform field experiments in large social survey via CASI. The 
topics of experiment are garbage problem and bid rigging prevention. Nowadays, it becomes not 
unusual for political scientists to employ field experiment or laboratory one (reviewed in Kinder and 
Palfrey, 1993, McDermott, 2002). Unfortunately, however, field experiment warrants external 
validity, while laboratory experiment enhances internal validity, and hence there is trade-off between 
the two. CASI makes it possible to achieve both goals; interviewers take laptop computers to 
interviewees’ houses across the country (external validity) and the computers randomly assign 
interviewees to the treatment group and the control group (internal validity).  
The plan of the paper is as follows. The first section elaborates on our theory and the model. 
In the second section, we illustrate the experiment design. The third section shows the results of 
analysis. Finally, we conclude. 
 
THEORY 
 
We formally introduce a threshold public goods game here (see, for example, Cadsby et al., 2007). N 
players decide to cooperate or not cooperate simultaneously. When players cooperate, it pays cost C. 
If the number of cooperators, K, is more than the minimum integer above threshold level, T, public 
good are provided and all players gain benefit B, whichever it cooperate or not. Suppose B > C. 
There are two kinds of pure strategy equilibria. In a success equilibrium, K=T. In the failure 
equilibrium, K=0. We illustrate the reason by way of an example case where three actors, X, Y and Z, 
play the game and T/N = 2/3. In one success equilibrium, X and Y cooperate while Z does not 
cooperate, which is denoted by {C, C, D}. In this case, public goods are provided. If either X or Y 
does not cooperate, there won’t be public goods and the player’s utility decreases from B-C to 0. If Z 
cooperates, its utility decreases from B to B-C. Thus, none has incentive to change its strategy. 
Similarly, {C, D, C} and {D, C, C} are also Nash equilibria. {D, D, D} is the failure equilibrium, 
where public goods are not provided. Even if a player changes its action, it fails to gain public goods 
and its utility decreases from 0 to -C. It is easy to generalize this case into the case where N>3. Since 
players are exchangeable, in order to judge whether a strategy profile consists of a Nash equilibrium, 
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we only have to consider the number of cooperators, K.  
Obviously, the success equilibrium is better than failure one for everybody. But game theory 
does not tell us which equilibrium players choose. We argue choice between the two depends on 
players’ expectation of others’ behavior. If a player has optimistic expectation that many others help 
public goods creation, the player is willing to cooperate. If a player has pessimistic expectation that 
not so many people stand for public goods, the player is loath to share the burden. Thus, expectation 
is a key for solving the collective action problem. 
One of tools to enhance such expectation is clarity of information. If political leaders succeed 
in framing public goods as “easy issue” instead of “hard issue” (Carmines and Stimson, 1980) 
ordinary people are more likely to take part in solution of public goods for two reasons. On the one 
hand, since citizens understand how good promised public goods are, they cooperate. We call this 
“direct effect” of presenting pubic good as easy issue on public good provision. On the other hand, a 
citizen expects that the others also understand how good public goods are and participate in public 
goods creation. This is the effect of easy issue on expectation formation. As a result of this, the 
citizen also has every reason to pay public goods cost. This is the effect of shared expectation on 
public good provision. Both effects compose “indirect effect” of easy issue on public good provision. 
What makes players choose the success equilibrium rather than the failure one is direct effect of easy 
issue as well as indirect effect of easy issue through formation of shared expectation. 
In real life, since direct effect and indirect effect work simultaneously, it is very difficult to 
distinguish them. Thus, in order to test for one effect, it is necessary to control the other. From the 
above, we derive the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1 (Direct Effect): A subject is more likely to cooperate in an easy issue condition than in a 
hard issue condition, given that the subject knows that the others are given a hard 
issue condition. 
H2 (Indirect Effect): A subject in an easy issue condition is more likely to cooperate when the 
subject knows that the others are given an easy issue condition than a hard issue 
condition. 
 
This is exactly what we aim to establish in the experiment, to which we turn in the next section. 
 
EXPERIMENT 
 
According to the above discussion, we conducted two experiments with general population to 
explore the effects of two independent variables:  types of information (easy vs. hard) and types of 
information receiver (self vs. the others).  We should note that this is not strictly hypothesis-testing 
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type experiment. Rather, this is exploratory experiment to examine how the two independent 
variables affect on the people’s cooperative behavior. 
 
Outline 
A major difficulty to implement an experiment for general population is instruction. The instruction 
should be understandable for every respondent.  In a laboratory experiment with university students, 
we usually use a verbal instruction for experiment appearing on a computer display.  It is however 
not a good strategy for this research because some of respondents may be hard to read a long 
sentence.  For this problem, instruction should reasonably depend on verbal expression, but not too 
much.  We therefore decided to use Flash Animation for the instruction. The animation helps 
intuitive understanding for all the population.   
We conducted two experiments, one concerning the garbage problem and the other concerning 
bid-rigging problem as described above.  The former experiment was carried out in July 2007 just 
before the Upper House election and the latter in September 2007 right after the election.  In the 
following, we first introduce the garbage problem, which has the same game structure with our 
model. We then featured the bid-rigging problem that directly examines people’s voting behavior6. 
In both experiments, respondents were requested to watch the flash animation. The animation 
explained a hypothetical social problem in the living area of each respondent.  After the explanation, 
they chose either “cooperation (buying a new costly trash bag, or costly voting)” or “noncooperation 
(not buying the bag, or not voting).”  The flash animations of both experiments had basically the 
same structure of story because both had the same game structure (threshold public goods problem). 
In the garbage problem, if half or more of people in town uses the new trash bag, the problem will be 
solved for sure. But the problem will remain when less than half uses the bag.   
In the bid-rigging problem, if half or more of people in town vote for the new ordinance, the 
problem will be solved for sure.  The flush animation gives the instruction that the respondent 
should go to voting place near the living place on a certain day and certain rage of time.   
 
Subjects 
Since both experiments were conducted as a part of CASI survey, all the respondents of CASI are 
subjects.  In the first experiment the number of subjects is 736, female 361(49.0%) and male 
375(51.0%); in the second one 780, female 376(48.2%) and male 403(51.7%).7   
 
Experimental Design 
                                                  
6 One major reason that we featured the garbage problem, which appears irrelevant to voting behavior, is 
Japanese law restriction. Any experiments possibly affecting people’s voting decision is prohibited. 
7 For details of sampling process and survey procedure, see the paper by Masaru Kohno et.al. which is 
presented at the same APSA panel. 
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As note earlier, the structure of both experiments is the threshold public goods provision game. The 
public goods in the experiments were provided if and only if the half of the population cooperates.  
There are two kinds of Nash equilibria in this game that have representative characteristics; all 
noncooperation and half of people cooperation.  According to our argument, both the level of 
people’s expectation for other people’s cooperation and their own understanding level depend on 
how clear the information is, and who receives the information.  If everyone receives easy 
information, it would produce high levels of both expectation and understandings.  On the other 
hand, if everyone receives hard information, it would produce low levels of such expectation and 
understandings.  One interesting question is what happens if a respondent and others have different 
kinds of information.  For example, when only you have easy information and the others have hard 
information, how would you expect cooperation from others?  It is necessary to realize this sort of 
situation to well distinguish the effects of people’s expectation for themselves from those of their 
expectation for others.  
As the independent variables, we introduced EASY vs. HARD information and self vs. the 
others as the information receiver.  EASY manipulation means that respondents got easy and short 
information whereas HARD manipulation means that they got long and difficult information.  
There are four experimental conditions possible:  EASY information given to both self and the 
others (EE), HARD information given to both self and the others (HH), EASY information given to 
self whereas HARD information given to the others (EH) and HARD information given to self 
whereas EASY information given to the others (EH).  To be more precise, in the latter two cases, it 
is necessary to make respondents THINK that the others are given another kind of information in the 
actual manipulation.  Direct and indirect effects are confounded in EE and HH, but to introduce EH 
and EH makes us possible to isolate indirect effect.   
However, it is impossible that you expect the others have only HARD information when you 
know only EASY information because you should have known that the others’ EASY information.  
Thus, the experimental design should be EE, EH, and HH.   
In both experiments, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions.  
 
Manipulation of Public Information and Private Information: Garbage Problem 
We show how each story is explained with the flash animation in our instruction.  In the garbage 
problem, we started with showing a picture that a mass of trash bags with some crows on them, 
saying  
“Recently, in your local area, it has been pointed out as a major problem that 
crows, dogs and stray cats pick at trash and tear garbage out of the bags.  
Local newspapers and TV stations report the problem of bad odor being 
spread and landscape being impaired.  In order to solve the problem, a new 
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trash bag has been developed.” (Figure 1)  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
After the explanation, the animation introduces “a new trash bag.”  This bag has three major 
features to solve this problem.  An anchorman of a hypothetical news show appears in a TV screen, 
and he explains the features.  While in EE version he explains the information with short phrases, 
in HH and EH version, he explains it only with long and difficult phrases (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).  
This manipulation is to make it clear that the information given by the anchorman would be public 
and shared by all the people in town.    
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
More precisely, the short version of the explanation on the three features was described in the 
following way: First, it is “invisible to crows,” second, it has “terrible taste for animals,” and 
finally, it is “very tough.”  These explanations are straightforward and easy to understand.   
In the other version of animation, we had “HARD” explanation.  The first feature was 
explained as “This bag is specially stained with atypical color. It is hard for crows, dogs or 
cats--hereinafter collectively called “designated animals”-- to detect.”  The second was 
explained as “This bag contains special substance which inspires disgust when designated 
animals take this bag by mouth (Notice: This bag does not damage animals’ health at all).”  
Finally, the third was explained as “This bag is highly resistant to destruction by designated 
animals compared to conventional trash bags.” 
    Subsequently, a professor came up on the display and summarized the given information of the 
hypothetical TV news. This information was given only to the respondent personally.  In other 
words, the explanation by the professor was not shared among people in town. In EE and HH 
conditions (Figure 4 and 5), he only repeated the information that anchorman explained, whereas in 
EH conditions he tried to summarize the difficult information given by anchorman in a more 
understandable manner (Figure 6).  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
[Figure 5 around here] 
[Figure 6 around here] 
 
The information by the anchorman was public whereas the information by the professor was 
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private and the other people in local area did not know this privately given information.  The 
former refers to information to the others, while the latter refers to information to self. 
The introduction of these two kinds of information source, anchorman and professor, was 
designed to make subjects recognize the EH condition where they receive both easy and hard 
information but the others in the town receive only hard information. 
As a result, with controlling the types of information (EASY vs. HARD) and types of 
information receiver (self vs. the others), we could suppose that while in EE and HH conditions 
subjects imagine “We share the same information”, in EH condition they imagine “We have different 
information”. 
In the flush animation, there was also the description of the game structure.  The anchorman 
described if the half or more of people in town used the new trash bag, the problem would be solved 
for sure. But the problem would remain when less than half used the bag.  In addition, we prepared 
a question for manipulation check and created imitation of this hypothetical trash bag and put the 
picture on the display to make the story realistic.  It also had the information corresponding to 
assigned condition (Figure 7). 
 
[Figure 7 around here] 
 
Manipulation of Public Information and Private Information: Bid-rigging Problem 
In the bid-rigging problem experiment, we started the description of the problem as follows.   
“Recently, in your local area, it has been reported as a major problem that 
some politicians pressure the local government to give lucrative public 
works contracts to certain construction companies.  These politicians are 
said to accept money from the companies in exchange.  In other words, the 
local government is wasting your tax money. In order to solve the problem, 
a new rule has been developed.” (Figure 8) 
 
[Figure 8 around here] 
 
After the description of the problem, the animation this time introduced “a new ordinance.”  
This ordinance has three features to solve the problem.  Exactly in the same way as the garbage 
problem, the anchorman appeared in the hypothetical TV news and gave public information to the 
respondent.  The professor also came up on the display to give private information afterwards.  
Although the contents of the problems were different, the procedure of explanation and manipulation 
is the same. 
In the bid-rigging problem, three features of the new ordinance were as follows:  “It can 
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effectively cut the costs for construction,” “It punishes unfair bidders,” and “It excludes 
unqualified bidders.” These were the EASY information. 
The HARD information was:  “It enhances a substantial reduction in budgets for 
constructions by introducing the regulation prohibiting selective tendering and private 
contract and by strict enhancement of general and open bidding regulation,” “It enhances 
openness of bidding processes by the regulation that monitoring system of general bidding 
process should be operated by third parties” and “It introduces a regulation that bidders with 
unqualified records are strictly excluded from open bidding process.”  
    In this problem, there was the description of game structure that if the half or more of people in 
town voted for the new ordinance, the problem would be solved for sure.  
We note that we inserted questions after each of above manipulations to check their effects and 
to confirm respondents’ level of understandings and expectation for others. It makes it possible for 
us to check if the experimental manipulations had worked for each respondent. 
  
Dependent variables 
The final display of the flush animation asked if the respondents would make a costly decision.   
In the garbage problem, the respondents were finally asked if they would buy the trash bag. 
Buying behavior is cooperation8. In the bid-rigging problem, the respondents’ final decision is 
whether they would vote or not. The flush animation gave the instruction that the respondent should 
go to voting place near the living place on a certain day and certain rage of time.  Though the costs 
for voting were varied with respondents, this voting behavior would be reasonably costly for 
everyone. For controlling external factors, we asked how long they take to reach their voting places. 
 
EXPERIMETAL RESULTS 
 
With results appeared in Table1 and 2, their statistical analysis showed that our experimental 
conditions – explanation of the proposed rules in a different way- do not affect, in both “Garbage 
Problem” and “Bid-rigging Problem”, respondent’s behavior as we have expected. To recognize 
reasons why information conditions do not control respondent’s behavior, we begin with 
manipulation check. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
[Table 2 around here] 
                                                  
8 The cost was about $1.5 per bag. For controlling external factors, we had asked a question about cost to 
respondent prior to the flash animation starting.  We asked how much they pay for trash bag in their 
actual living area. It makes us easier to analyze the data by controlling cost of cooperation. 
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Manipulation Check for “Garbage Problem” and “Bid-rigging Problem” 
In the “Garbage Problem” it seems that respondents don’t understand sufficiently the “Clarity 
Difference” of information conditions (see Table 3). In contrast, in the “Bid-rigging Problem” they 
understand quite correctly its difference. Kruskal Wallis test reveals that there is significant 
difference in the “Clarity Difference” across three information conditions: Χ2(2)=15.98, P=.000 (see 
Table 4).  
 
[Table 3 around here] 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
To compare the “Clarity Difference” between three conditions, we used the binomial logit 
model. Dependent variable is a probability of respondent who choose 1 or 2 with “Clarity Difference 
of Information” question: pi. Independent variables are HH dummy and EE dummy: the former is 
coded 1 if respondent is in HH group, 0 otherwise; the latter is coded 1 if respondent is in EE group, 
0 otherwise. The results appear in the Table 5 confirm the influence of information conditions on the 
“Clarity Difference”: in comparison with respondent in EH condition where different explanation 
were given between respondent and other people (in his local area), subjects either in EE or HH 
condition, where they receive the same explanation as others could have a tendency to feel “we share 
the same information about the proposed rule”. It follows from the above analysis that our 
experimental manipulation worked better in “Bid-rigging Problem” than in “Garbage Problem”. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
Effects of Information Conditions on Expectation in the “Bid-rigging Problem”9 
After the experiment of “garbage problem”, we thought it necessary to know if respondents 
understand well the proposed rules and how they expect others’ comprehension about them in each 
information condition. So in the “bid-rigging problem”, we inserted questions with which to confirm 
respondents’ understandings level of proposed rules and their expectation for others’ comprehension.
Ｗe call the former “Self-Reported Comprehension (SRC)” and the latter “Expectation for Others’ 
Comprehension (EOC)”  
In spite of respondents’ correct understanding about “Clarity Difference” in “bid-rigging 
problem”, the results appeared in Table 6 and 7 show that with our three information conditions, we 
could not manipulate subject’s self-reported comprehension (SRC) nor his/her expectation for 
                                                  
9 Questions about “Self-Reported Comprehension” and “Expectation for Others’ Comprehension” 
were implemented only in “Bid-rigging Problem”. 
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others’ comprehension (EOC). We think this is the reason why our experimental conditions did not 
affect respondent’s behavior.  
 
[Table 6 around here] 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
Expecｔation and Political Decision Making 
Looking at model 1 and model 2 of Table 8, we might find the main effects of both SRC 
(Self-Reported Comprehension) and EOC (Expectation for Others’ Comprehension). But model 3 
teaches us immediately these two main effects are only an appearance. Actually as these two 
variables are correlated strongly (Speaman’s correlation coefficient is about 0.6 at 1% level), it is 
probable that this correlation causes multicollinearity (see model 3). Hence comparing these models 
and taking into account of the multicollinearity, it results that it is SRC, not EOC that influence 
voter’s behavior. It is also noted that this effect can be observed if information conditions are 
controlled (see Model4). 
 
[Table 8 around here] 
 
As the above analysis reveals that people who are confident in their comprehension about 
proposed rules are driven to go to vote by their own motivation, in the next analysis we exclude the 
respondents who have high SRC level from the data to examine effects of EOC for those whose SRC 
level is relatively low. We ran binomial logit estimations with the independent variable as interaction 
of SRC and EOC and obtained a significant interaction. It confirms that with respondents who are 
relatively less confident in their comprehension, not only comprehension level but also expectation 
for others could give some impact on their vote choice (see Table 9). 
 
[Table 9 around here] 
 
 
Discussion  
Although with our independent variable, that is information conditions, we are not able to 
manipulate SRC (Self-Reported Comprehension)  nor EOC (Expectation for Others’ 
Comprehension), we observe some interesting findings regarding “comprehension” and 
“expectation” on public action. These findings suggest that if subject’s expectation had been 
manipulated through our information conditions, we could have obtained results that we had 
expected. SRC influences subject’s vote choice and EOC also affects it when subjects are not so 
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confident with their own comprehension.  
    In this experiment we have tried not only to change levels of difficulty of information contents 
regarding proposed rules but also to differentiate the way in which information was diffused to 
subjects. This setting might have been too complicated for subjects who were randomly selected 
from the Japanese population at large10. Therefore, to make experimental condition as simple as 
possible could be one of the means to improve experimental design. Besides, to give real incentive 
(e.g., monetary reward) to subjects could make them consider other’s behavior more seriously. 
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 Question 35
Push the Enter key 
to go to a next page
Recently, in your local area,  
it has been pointed out as a 
major problem that crows, 
dogs and stray cats pick at
trash and tear garbage out of 
the bags
Local newspapers and TV 
stations report the problem of 
bad odor being spread and 
landscape being impaired.
In order to solve the problem, 
a new trash bag has been
developed. 
Figure 1: Garbage Problem
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Three features of 
the new trash bags
Invisible to crows!!
The trash bags are specially stained 
with atypical color. It is hard for 
crows, dogs or cats--hereinafter
collectively called “designated
animals”-- to detect it.
Figure 2: Anchorman’s Explanation in EE Condition
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Three features of 
the new trash bags
The trash bags are specially
stained with atypical color. It is 
hard for crows, dogs or cats--
hereinafter collectively called
“designated animals”-- to detect it.
Figure 3: Anchorman’s Explanation in HH and EH 
Condition
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Hi!
Let me summarize this 
information for you.
It means that this bag is:
“Invisible to crows.”
Figure 4: Professor’s Explanation in EE Condition
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Hi!
Let me summarize this 
information for you.
It means that this bag is::
“Hard for designated
animals to detect it.”
Figure 5: Professor’s Explanation in HH Condition
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Hi!
Let me summarize this 
information for you.
It means that this bag is:
“Invisible to crows.”
Notice: This information is available for you only.
Others in your area do not know it.
Figure 6: Professor’s Explanation in EH Condition
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Invisible to crows!!
This bag is specially stained with atypical color. It is 
hard for crows, dogs or cats--hereinafter collectively
called “designated animals”-- to detect it.
Household trash bag
Terrible taste!!
This bag contains special substance which inspires 
disgust when designated animals take this bag by
mouth (Notice: This bag does not damage animals 
at all).
Very tough!!
This bag is highly resistant to destruction by 
designated animals compared to conventional trash 
bags.
Figure 7: New Household trash bag
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Recently, in your local area, it has 
been reported as a major problem 
that some politicians pressure the 
local government to give lucrative
public works contracts to certain
construction companies.
These politicians are said to 
accept money  from the 
companies in exchange. In other 
words, the local government is 
wasting your tax money.
In order to solve the problem, a
new rule has been developed. 
Push the Enter key 
to go to a next page
Figure 8: Bid-rigging Problem
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Table 1: Consumers’ Behavior and Information Conditions at “Garbage Problem” 
 Buy Don’t Buy DK/NA Sum 
Information Conditions Frequency （％） Frequency （％） Frequency （％） Frequency （％）
EE 134 51.0% 129 49.0% 0 0% 263 100.0%
EH 113 46.9% 128 53.1% 0 0% 241 100.0%
HH 123 53.0% 109 47.0% 0 0% 232 100.0%
Number of obs 370  366    736  
Pearson’s Independence Test: Χ2(2)=1.852, P=.396 
Note: DK/NA is excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 2: Voters’ Behavior and Information Conditions at “Bid-rigging Problem” 
 Vote Don’t Vote DK/NA Sum 
Information Conditions Frequency （％） Frequency （％） Frequency （％） Frequency （％）
EE 198 77.0% 51 19.8% 8 3.1% 257 100.0%
EH 203 82.9% 37 15.1% 5 2.0% 156 100.0%
HH 218 78.4% 53 19.1% 7 2.5% 172 100.0%
Number of obs 619  141  20  780  
Pearson’s Independence Test: Χ2(2)=2.356, P=.308 
Note: DK/NA is excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 3: Information Conditions and “Clarity Difference of Information” at 
“Garbage Problem” 
 
Yes 
(1) 
No 
(2) 
DK 
(3) 
NA 
 (4) 
Sum 
Information Conditions Frequency（％） Frequency（％） Frequency（％） Frequency（％） Frequency（％）
EE 122(46.4%) 20(7.6%) 116(44.1%) 5(1.9%) 263(100%) 
EH 92(38.2%) 56(23.2%) 91(37.8%) 2(0.8%) 241(100%) 
HH 102(44.0%) 27(11.6%) 100(43.1%) 3(1.3%) 232(100%) 
Number of obs 316 103 307 10 736 
Answer 
Kruskal Wallis Test: Χ2(2)=.002, P=.999. 
Note: Question is “Do you think the explanation given to you regarding the proposed rule is same as 
that given to other people in your local area?”; DK/NA is excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 4: Information Conditions and “Clarity Difference of Information” at 
“Bid-rigging Problem” 
 
exactly same 
(1) 
mostly same 
(2) 
quite different
(3) 
completely 
different 
(4) 
DK/NA 
(5,6) 
Sum 
Information Conditions Frequency（％） Frequency（％） Frequency（％）
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
EE 60(23.3%) 119(46.3%) 15(5.8%) 
2 
(0.8%) 
61 
(19.5%) 
257 
(100%) 
EH 32(6.5%) 100(38.8%) 33(26.5%) 
5 
(13.5%) 
78 
(13.5%) 
245 
(100%) 
HH 59(8.3%) 121(39.9%) 27(25.2%) 
4 
(10.8%) 
67 
(15.8%) 
278 
(100%) 
Number of obs 151 340 75 11 203 780 
Answer 
Kruskal Wallis Test :Χ2(2)=15.98, P=.000. 
Note: Question is “In terms of the levels of clarity, do you think the explanation given to you 
regarding the proposed rule is different from that given to other people in your local area?”; DK/NA 
is excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 5: Logit Analysis of  “Clarity Difference of Information” at “Bid-rigging 
Problem” 
Independent Variables Exp(β) Wald Value P value 
Intercept  .168 *** 86.900 .000 
EE dummy 1.915 ** 7.213 .007 
HH dummy 1.676 * 4.580 .032 
Number of obs 780 
 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001(one-tailed test) 
Note: Dependent variables dummy coded 1 if respondent answered 1 or 2 at “Clarity Difference” 
question, 0 otherwise; β is standardized binomial logit regression coefficients and exp (β) is its 
exponential value. 
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Table6: Information Conditions and “Self-Reported Comprehension Levels” 
 
Understood 
all of it 
(1) 
Understoo
d most of 
it 
(2) 
Understood 
about half of 
it 
(3) 
Understoo
d a little of 
it 
(4) 
Did not 
understand 
at all 
(5) 
DK/NA 
 
(6,7) 
Sum 
Information 
Conditions 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
EE 
64 
(24.9%) 
129 
(50.2%) 
26 
(10.1%) 
20 
(7.8%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
17 
(6.6%) 
257 
(100%) 
EH 
42 
(17.1%) 
133 
(54.3%) 
27 
(11.0% 
19 
(7.8%) 
0 
(0%) 
24 
(9.8%) 
245 
(100%) 
HH 
53 
(19.1%) 
150 
(54.0%) 
41 
(14.7%) 
14 
(5.0%) 
2 
(0.7%) 
18 
(6.5%) 
278 
(100%) 
Number of obs 159 412 94 53 3 69 780 
Χ2(2)=3.708, P=.157; DK/NA is excluded from the analysis. 
Note: Question is “How well did you understand the proposed rule?”; Kruskal Wallis test reveals 
that there is no significant difference in the “Self-Reported Comprehension(SRC) Levels” across 
three information conditions. 
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 Table 7: Information Conditions and “Expectation for Others’ Comprehension 
Levels” 
 
Understood 
all of it 
(1) 
Understood 
most of it 
(2) 
Understood 
about half 
of it 
(3) 
Understoo
d a little of 
it 
(4) 
Did not 
understand 
at all 
(5) 
DK/NA 
 
(6,7) 
Sum 
Information 
Conditions 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
Frequenc
y（％） 
Frequency
（％） 
EE 
29 
(11.3%) 
100 
(38.9%) 
61 
(23.7%) 
27 
(10.5%) 
2 
(0.8%) 
38 
(14.8%) 
257 
(100%) 
EH 
16 
(6.5%) 
95 
(38.8%) 
65 
(26.5%) 
33 
(13.5%) 
3 
(1.2%) 
33 
(13.5%) 
245 
(100%) 
HH 
23 
(8.3%) 
111 
(39.9%) 
70 
(25.2%) 
30 
(10.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
44 
(15.8%) 
278 
(100%) 
Number of obs 68 306 196 90 5 115 780 
Χ2(2)=1.528, P=.466; DK/NA is excluded from the analysis. 
Note: Question is “Do you think how well the others in your local are can understand the proposed 
rule?”; Kruskal Wallis test reveals that there is no significant difference in the “Expectation for 
Others’ Comprehension (EOC)Levels” across three information conditions:  
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Table 8: Logit Model of Vote Choice 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model ５ 
Independent Variables Exp(β) Exp(β) Exp(β) Exp(β) Exp(β) 
Intercept 18.327***  11.849***    18.754***     27.524***    9.022*** 
SRC .575***    .582***    .566***  
EOC     .743*** .982 (p=.843)   
SRC＊EOC     .927(p=.147) 
EE dummy         .558*  
HH dummy       .641†  
AIC 636.6 667.5 638.5 635.2 644.2 
Number of obs 739 
- †p < .10,  * p < .05. ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Note: β is standardized binomial logit regression coefficients and exp (β) is its exponential value 
with standard errors in parentheses; If probability of ith respondent’s vote choice is written by pi, 
dependent Variable is defined as logit(pi), that is log(pi/1- pi ); From all respondents, we exclude 
those who answered DK/NA at vote choice, or “ at “Expectation for Others’ Comprehension ” 
question or “Self-Reported Comprehension” question.; As time cost is not influential at all on the 
vote choice, this element is not inserted in any model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
 30
Table 9: Logit Model of Vote Choice with Selected Respondents 
Independent Variables Exp(β) Wald Value P value 
Intercept 8.072 *** 47.50 .000 
SRC＊EOC .936 *** 179.341 .000 
AIC 559.04 
Number of obs 604 
- †p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Note: If probability of ith respondent’s vote choice is written by pi, dependent variable is defined as 
logit(pi), that is log(pi/1- pi ); From all respondents, we exclude those who answered DK/NA at vote 
choice, or answered “Understood all of it (1)” at “Self-Reported Comprehension” question. If we 
exclude those who answered “Understood most of it (2)”, the result does not change; As time cost is 
not influential at all on the vote choice, this element is not inserted in any model. 
 
 
